Where it sits
The judgement has to be present for this to count. That's what makes it hard to explain.
Tell it apart
| Aspect | Akrasia | Procrastination |
|---|---|---|
| Failure of | Reason | Self-regulation |
| Verdict is | Live and contradicted | Present but not live |
| Timing | At the moment | Over time |
| Puzzling | Yes | Irrational, but explained |
Procrastination is a delay; akrasia is a contradiction. Standard definitions of procrastination already build the irrationality in — delaying while expecting to be worse off for it — but akrasia demands more: the verdict has to be live, present, and contradicted at the moment you act. Whether procrastination is therefore a species of akrasia is genuinely argued over.
Opposite of Akrasia
- EnkrateiaGreek 'in-power', continence: having the wrong desire and overriding it, where akrasia gives in to it.
What it doesn't mean
It's much narrower and stranger: acting against your own all-things-considered judgement at the time of acting, with the judgement still in view. The critical element is an agent who simultaneously holds an evaluative judgement favouring a different action while intentionally pursuing an alternative. Putting off a task because you'd rather not is often just an unexamined preference — not akrasia at all.
The entire philosophical interest is that Socrates denied it's even possible, and Aristotle partly conceded. Aristotle moves toward Socrates' position, arguing that strict knowledge prevents akrasia — the incontinent person lacks unqualified knowledge at the moment of action. The live question isn't 'why are people weak' but 'in what sense could someone genuinely know better and still not do it'.
What it really means
Akrasia is the thing you did last night, and the reason philosophers have argued about it for two and a half thousand years is that Socrates said it cannot happen.
His claim, in the Protagoras, is blunt: no one who knows or believes a better course is available will continue on the present one. If you chose the worse thing, you must — at that moment — not really have believed it was worse. Apparent weakness of will is a failure of knowledge, not of strength.
That sounds obviously wrong until you try to describe what akrasia would actually involve. You'd need an agent who holds an evaluative judgement favouring one action while intentionally doing another, with the judgement live and in view. Not forgetting. Not being persuaded otherwise. Simultaneously believing this is worse and doing it. Aristotle devoted a whole book to the problem and ended up partway back toward Socrates — arguing that strict knowledge does prevent it, and that the incontinent person lacks unqualified knowledge at the moment of action.
So the useful thing this word does is exclude most of what gets filed under it. Putting off a task because you'd rather not is usually just an unexamined preference. Akrasia proper requires the verdict to be present and contradicted — which is rarer than it feels, and much harder to explain than laziness.
Aristotle's two varieties are worth knowing for self-diagnosis: astheneia, where you deliberate correctly and then fail to follow through, and propeteia, where you act before deliberating at all.
Where it comes from
Greek — alpha privative, 'not'
Greek — power, strength, mastery (as in demo-cracy)
Literally 'lack of command' — over yourself. Its opposite is enkrateia, 'in-power', continence: the person who has the bad desire and overrides it. Both are failures of full virtue; the fully virtuous person doesn't have the fight.
- Early 4th c. BCE
Plato's Protagoras has Socrates deny akrasia is possible: no one who knows or believes a better course is available will continue on the present one.
- 335–322 BCE
Aristotle devotes the first ten chapters of Nicomachean Ethics Book VII to it, splitting it into astheneia (deliberates well, fails to follow through) and propeteia (impetuosity — acts without deliberating).
In real life
- Fully convinced she should go to bed — and saying so out loud — she starts another episode.
- He has decided, clearly and sincerely, that the second slice of cake is a mistake, and he is eating it while thinking exactly that.
- A smoker who believes, at that very moment, that this cigarette is the wrong choice lights it all the same.
Questions
Q01What is akrasia in philosophy?
Acting against your own better judgement — knowing or believing a different course is better and intentionally doing the worse one anyway. The defining feature is that the agent simultaneously holds an evaluative judgement favouring a different action while intentionally pursuing an alternative. Aristotle treats it in Nicomachean Ethics Book VII.
Q02Why did Socrates deny akrasia?
Because he held that no one knowingly chooses the worse. The Protagoras puts it directly: 'No one who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of action, better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present course.' On this view, apparent weakness of will is really a failure of knowledge — you misjudged which option was better.
Q03Is akrasia the same as procrastination?
No. Akrasia is the specific case of acting against a judgement you currently hold; procrastination often involves no such internal contradiction. Aristotle further divides akrasia into astheneia — where you deliberate, choose rightly, then fail to follow through — and propeteia, acting on emotion without deliberating at all.
Sources
- Weakness of Will — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Aristotle's Ethics — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- akrasia (etymology) — Wiktionary.